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Government often has been maligned as a source of funding for innovative 
research due to stories of failures caused by factors such as bureaucratic 
micromanagement, overly-restrictive regulation, and lack of customer focus. While basic 
research may be regarded as a public good, and therefore within the domain of 
government funding, applied research is often considered best left to the private sector. 
One government agency sometimes mentioned as an exception to the rule of government 
mismanagement in applied research is the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).
Founded in 1958, ARP A has compiled an impressive list of accomplishments in the 
area of military technology. Ironically, the agency is known equally well for the 
commercial spin-offs of its research, particularly in the area of computer technology. 
These commercial successes have led many in Washington, D.C. to believe the agency's 
research agenda should be expanded to focus explicitly on "dual-use" technologies, with 
the intent of benefiting both the commercial and military sectors simultaneously. 
Reflecting this mission expansion, in recent years ARPA also has been viewed as a funding 
instrument to prop up America's high-technology industries against foreign competition.
Surprisingly, no study has attempted to quantify ARPA's impact on technology in 
relation to its investment. This paper lays the groundwork for such an effort by surveying 
the most promising research evaluation methods, reviewing the sources of information 
available to support an evaluation, and identifying the potential pitfalls. Through a survey 
of articles related to ARPA and a review of a study commissioned by the agency in the 
late 1980s, the paper identifies factors potentially responsible for ARPA's well-known list 
of achievements. Finally, the study warns that ARPA's recent direction may have taken it 
off the trail-blazing path it once traveled.
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2In troduction
Many have maligned government agencies as a source of funding for technology, 
arguing that government projects are all too often driven by concerns other than 
efficiency, effectiveness, or public welfare. The historical failures of government attempts 
to manage technology are well documented (Squires 1984; Eads and Nelson 1971; 
Griliches 1987). A particularly interesting example is provided by George Eads and 
Richard Nelson. They studied the commercial airline industry after World War II and 
found that, by 1970, 80 percent of the world's commercial airline fleet was built in the 
United States. This happened even though U.S. manufacturers had to fund their own 
research and development, while the British government paid for up to fifty percent of the 
development costs of new aircraft and required their own airlines to buy them. In another 
study, Zvi Griliches examined trends in productivity for a sample of 652 manufacturing 
firms and found that, over the 1967-1977 time period, the greater the proportion of total 
research funded by the companies, rather than the government, the greater the value- 
added of that research (Griliches 1987).
Critics of government-funded research and development (R&D) argue that 
government failures demonstrate the need to leave technological funding to the private 
sector, where the potential benefits of investments in new technology are likely to be 
weighed more carefully against the costs and risks involved.
A primary obstacle to efficient government funding is, of course, the ever- 
expanding bureaucracy which seems so prevalent in government institutions. 
Understanding this phenomenon of constant expansion of the government and its agencies 
requires a review of Buchanan and Tullock's theory of Public Choice (1962). Political 
theorists often assume the individual working in the public sector acts not in his or her 
own self-interest, but in the public interest. Indeed, proponents of socialism rely on the
3idea that personal motives for private gain can be replaced by the motivation to serve the 
social good.
At the very foundation of democracy, however, is the reliance upon competition 
among individual actors in the economy, all of whom operate under the same set of 
constraining laws. In the democratic system, therefore, the concept of individuals acting 
in their own self interests is crucial to the operation of economic markets. Is it then 
reasonable to expect people to act in their own self-interests in their private-sector 
transactions, but in the interest of the so-called "public good" when employed by the 
government? Buchanan and Tullock and the adherents to the theory of Public Choice do 
not think so. They argue that those working for the government will pursue their self- 
interests in both their public and private lives. Buchanan and Tullock further argue that no 
clear-cut definition of the "public good" exists in the first place. Because people rarely 
agree on what constitutes this nebulous public good, the assertion that the majority of 
politicians strive for such a goal is rather meaningless (Buchanan and Tullock 1962).
One way for politicians to act in their own self-interests is to garner publicity for 
themselves as they champion causes which are disproportionately beneficial to their own 
constituencies. In so doing, they hope to secure the loyalty, in the form of reelection 
votes, of an admiring constituency. Obviously, if all politicians voted independently, only 
the rare issue of apparent benefit to the majority of the country would receive enough 
support to become law, as each legislator would vote in favor of only those issues 
beneficial to his or her own constituency. In reality, however, legislators form coalitions 
and engage in a ritual of quid pro quo which ensures that most, if not all of them, are able 
to amass a treasure chest of pork for their respective constituencies. This, incidentally, 
provides a partial explanation for the staying power, or apparent advantage enjoyed by 
incumbents, as well as the Herculean effort required to decrease the federal budget.
4Cutting an item out of the budget may risk the crumbling of coalitions, the future 
withdrawal of support for budget items favored by other legislators, and "hell to pay" at 
the ballot box. Justifying their own pet programs while blaming the rest of the Congress 
for not balancing the budget is, unfortunately, a much safer option for most politicians.
One government agency sometimes mentioned as an exception to the rule of 
government mismanagement is the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), 
previously known as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 
Edward E. David Jr., President Nixon's science advisor and a former Bell Laboratories 
executive, claims, "Among all the outfits that dispense public money, this one has 
produced the most" (Perry 1991, 65). Interestingly, the innovations for which ARPA is 
best known are the commercial applications of its research and development, often 
referred to as "spin-offs" (Brown and Wilson 1993). ARPA is most famous for its role in 
the development of the computer industry and as the sponsor of many important 
innovations in that industry. The agency has made its mark with such developments as 
automatic teller machines (ATM), computer graphics, the Internet (formerly the 
ARPANET), supercomputers, Artificial Intelligence (AI), expert systems, parallel 
processing, and even the computer "mouse" (Flamm 1987; Kitfield 1990). In addition to 
spinning off computer technology, ARPA has spun off entire companies, such as Silicon 
Graphics, Sun Microsystems, and MIPS Computer Systems. In an article about 
commercial spin-offs from defense spending, one writer for Fortune magazine even 
proposed that ARPA "may have done more for U.S. competitiveness than any other 
organization" (Perry 1991, 65). Ironically, ARPA probably is known less for its equally- 
impressive list of military accomplishments, which include "stealth" technology and "smart 
weapons," the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the National Aerospace Plane (NASP), 
night vision goggles, advanced sensing devices, and a myriad of other military advances.
5With such an impressive list of successes the question then begs to be asked, has ARPA 
proven itself to be significantly more efficient at funding technology than other agencies? 
If ARPA has been more successful at funding technology than other government agencies, 
then we might endeavor to identify and explain the reasons for ARPA's success, and 
thereby provide criteria for future government funding of scientific research.
Chapter 1 provides a brief history of government funding of scientific research, and 
traces the roots of pork barrel spending in the area of science funding. Chapter 2 reviews 
some of the common approaches to evaluating research and development, with an 
emphasis on those techniques most likely to apply to ARPA. Chapter 3 provides a brief 
review of ARPA's history. Chapter 4 addresses the problem of evaluating the agency's 
success and discusses the most comprehensive study on ARPA to date. Though no 
definitive answers exist, and detailed analysis is lacking, available evidence suggests the 
conclusion that ARPA has enjoyed greater-than-normal success in funding technology. 
Chapter 5 identifies some of the explanatory factors in ARPA's record of success, while 
Chapter 6 highlights some disturbing trends and concludes with a word of caution 
concerning the future of the agency.
6Chapter 1: A Brief History of Government-Funded Research
Large-scale government funding of research and development began during World 
War II. Prior to that time, the Department of Agriculture had administered research 
funds, but few other agencies had played a major role in funding research. Focused on 
military requirements during the war, government-funded research was tremendously 
successful at advancing the state-of-the-art in military weaponry. This funding led to the 
invention of radar, sonar, the proximity fuse, and the beginning of the atomic age. 
Government-funded research during this period also paved the way for several health-care 
advances, including penicillin and DDT. Focused on these successes, President Roosevelt 
and many of the nation's top scientists resolved that the government's role in funding 
research should continue (Martino 1992).
Since its inception in 1887, the Department of Agriculture has followed (and still 
follows) a set formula of disbursing research dollars "to assure that each state, and almost 
every congressional district, gets its share" (Martino 1992, 21). The department has not 
attempted to evaluate individual proposals before doling out its research funds. Instead, it 
has distributed its research funds, according to certain formulae, to ensure geographic 
equity (Martino 1992; Huffman and Evenson 1993). Ironically, economic analyses have 
found that the rates of return on agricultural research "have exceeded the normal rates of 
return on investment in the economy" (Schultz 1981, 105). One explanation for this 
success is that, because optimal agricultural practices differ across different regions and 
climates, distributing research funds geographically may be the best approach. Such a 
method is not, however, likely to be very efficient in those areas of scientific research 
which are not geographically dependent.
7Post-WWII agencies chose not to follow the Agriculture Department's example, 
but instead distributed research funds on the basis of peer review. Researchers submitted 
proposals to the respective agencies and a peer review panel decided which proposals 
were most worthy of funding. This system contradicted the desires of Vannevar Bush, the 
head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during the post-war Roosevelt 
administration. Bush advocated a system by which all government research grants would 
be administered by a single government agency, the National Science Foundation. 
Fortunately, the fact that research ended up being funded by multiple agencies probably 
helped prevent pork-barreling for a long while. Since the numerous agencies had to 
compete for proposals from top scientists, they had to earn good reputations (Martino
1992).
According to Joseph Martino, pork-barreling in science funding really did not 
become prevalent until 1983, when Washington lobbying firm Cassidy and Associates 
obtained direct appropriations for labs at Columbia University and Catholic University. 
Congress directed the Department of Energy (DOE) to spend the money without even 
asking the DOE, or anyone else in the scientific community, whether the project had any 
merit. Martino goes on to explain:
In 1983 and 1984 together, Congress appropriated $100 million for 
laboratories and research projects solely on the basis of lobbying by the 
recipients. There were neither requests by the government agencies 
directed to spend the money nor congressional hearings on any of these 
appropriations (1992, 2-3).
In 1985, this trend continued as Congress, without any hearings, ordered the DOE to 
spend $56.5 million for projects at nine universities. After the Department of Defense 
(DOD) established the University Research Initiative to sponsor defense-oriented research
8at universities, Congress directed which universities would receive the funds. Within 
seven years, annual pork-barrel appropriations for science grew from a few million to a 
quarter o f a billion dollars (Martino 1992).
Obviously, pork barrel spending is a suspect in some of the failures o f government- 
funded research over the past decade, but what about the decades and even centuries 
prior? If Martino is correct in his assertion that pork barrel spending in the area o f science 
funding is a rather recent occurrence, then some other factor must be responsible. In 
general, those who criticize government funding of science refer to government funding 
and targeting civilian technologies. Actually, the federal government has faired pretty 
well at funding military technology. The dominance of the American military machine and 
the desirability of American military hardware bears witness to this success. Instances of 
government failures have occurred when the government has decided that the market has 
overlooked a great opportunity and that it needs to push ahead in technological areas 
which the private sector has avoided. The lack of commercial investment in military 
R&D, which is explained in Chapter 3: History of ARPA, creates rich opportunities for 
ground-breaking research by government agencies. In the private sector, with a multitude 
of buyers and sellers, if no one is willing to invest in a particular area of applied research, 
the reason can be presumed to be an insufficient expected reward for the level of risk 
involved. If so, the phenomenon of government agencies experiencing failure in these 
areas should come as no surprise.
9Chapter 2: Evaluating Research and Development
Government research managers are interested in determining the value of 
the research they support for at least two reasons: to help them improve 
the management of their programs, and to demonstrate to their 
bureaucratic superiors, to Congress, and to agency clientele groups that 
their programs have produced benefits that justify their cost (Roessner 
1993, 192).
Evaluating Research and Development efforts is almost always a touchy subject. 
Dr. Alain Barbarie, in his essay on the evaluation of Canadian R&D (1993), identifies 
three primary difficulties in performing such evaluations. First, those outside the scientific 
community are justifiably uncomfortable with evaluating the work performed by scientists. 
Those in the position to make decisions regarding the fate of research organizations often 
are not scientists themselves, and may feel unqualified to pass judgment. Second, 
scientific research is very difficult to evaluate in terms of a traditional cost-benefit analysis, 
due to the fact that the results of scientific research may not be seen for many years. Also, 
the impact of a single research project may not be identifiable, as it combines with many 
other research projects to impact an innovation. Third, scientists themselves often resist 
the evaluations. As Dr. Barbarie explains,
The scientific community in the Federal Government tends to be reluctant 
to have R&D work evaluated by any criteria other than those of quality of 
research. Preservation of the status quo is obviously a strong incentive; 
however, many deeply believe that science, if done well, is always 
worthwhile and that outsiders have neither the right nor the necessary 
qualifications to question it (1993, 156).
Incidentally, the reluctance to evaluate R&D on other criteria is not peculiar to the public
sector. In a recent article, Bell Laboratories' scientist and Nobel laureate Amo Penzias
recounts a story of how researchers at his company were encouraged by management
(who, at Bell Labs, are also researchers) to build the world's most powerful laser diode.
They succeeded in doing this and for their efforts received much praise, including the "best
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paper" award at a professional conference, but they failed to meet the customer 
requirement for a producible and usable laser diode. These scientists failed to consider 
the customer's criteria for success. Evaluated from the customer's perspective, this effort 
would be regarded as a failure, yet the scientists considered it a rousing success. Penzias 
acknowledges the scientific value of producing a record-breaking laser, but ponders 
whether a much more valuable product might have resulted had the researchers included 
compatibility with existing fabrication methods and other customer requirements as 
constraints in their optimization effort (1995).
Despite these difficulties, evaluation of government-funded R&D has become a hot 
topic around the world. As a result of conferences sponsored by the Commission of the 
European Communities in the 1970s and 1980s, all European Community research 
projects were evaluated regularly by the mid-1980s. Japan also became serious about 
research evaluation in the early 1980s, and in fact commissioned the Asahi Research 
Center to survey the techniques in use throughout the world. Though the United States 
has been less enthusiastic about pursuing formal evaluation programs, the U.S. Congress 
has pushed for them, and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) has led the way in 
establishing such programs (Cozzens 1993). The benefit of establishing a formal review 
process is that reviews can be conducted on research in progress to identify any 
weaknesses to the program managers and allow them to make adjustments before going 
too far in the wrong direction.. The reviews also might be useful in evaluating the overall 
success of federal agencies and identifying common traits of successful programs. A 
multitude of evaluation approaches are available, but four of the most pertinent to ARPA 
are ratio models, economic models, bibliometrics, and peer review.
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1. Ratio Models
Ratio models are the most common method of evaluating the return on research 
and development programs. This is often done by expressing the outputs of an R&D 
program as a ratio to the R&D inputs used to produce them. Some of the ratios are based 
on subjective estimates. For instance, one might estimate the ratio of the net future value 
of stealth technology (a DARPA product) to the funds spent to develop that technology. 
Since most new military aircraft programs will likely incorporate signature reduction, or 
stealth, to some degree, such an estimation would require estimating the value of stealth to 
all the unknown implementations in the future. This would resemble an approach used by 
Alcoa, which prepares estimates of the impact on sales revenues and cost savings of each 
technological breakthrough resulting from its R&D expenditures (Link 1993). These 
impacts are then discounted to present values and added together, and the sum is divided 
by Alcoa's total R&D expenditures to provide a measure of the overall return on R&D. 
The credibility of the resulting ratio depends, o f course, on the accuracy of the impact 
forecasts and the assumed discount rates.
Other ratios are based on objectively-measured quantities. As an example, an 
appropriate quantitative ratio might be the number of weapon system innovations (new 
weapon systems, improvements to existing systems, or innovative ways of employing 
existing systems) divided by the agency's total budget. Though appealing for their 
simplicity, ratio models have several weaknesses. First, a problem common to all ratio 
models is the question of when to calculate the ratio. Because outputs may occur over 
many years, if the evaluation fails to consider outputs far enough into the future, it will 
underestimate the true ratio. Second, ratios can reward quantity at the expense of quality. 
For example, if an agency's success is judged by a ratio of the number of innovations to 
the agency's budget, its researchers will have incentive to produce marginal innovations in
12
great quantity rather than a few revolutionary innovations. Simply counting the number of 
innovations would not account for the value of each one. Finally, a ratio of outputs to 
R&D expenditures is flawed because R&D is only one of the inputs used to produce a 
given set of outputs. The profit from the sale of an automobile, for example, is due 
partially to the R&D investment, but is also due to the labor and capital inputs. This 
factor leads to the potential for overestimation of the value of R&D (Link 1993).
2. Economic Models
Another method of evaluating R&D is through the use of economic models. This 
method includes internal rate of return (IRR) and net present value (NPV) calculations, as 
well as the production function approach. From the field of accounting, 'TRR is defined as 
that discount rate which equates the present value of a project's expected cash inflows to 
the present value of the project's expected costs” (Brigham and Gapenski 1994, 394).
— -  =  0 
/=0(1 + IRRY
t = time period 
n = number of time periods
CFt = cash flow in period t (inflows positive, outflows negative)
IRR is used in financial management as a determinant of whether or not a proposed 
investment is expected to generate a positive net return. A project is pursued only if its 
IRR exceeds the expected cost of capital. Using the IRR approach to evaluate ARPA 
research would require estimating the monetary inflows to those organizations or 
companies which produce weapon systems using the knowledge gained from particular 
ARPA research efforts and solving for the IRR, which equates the present value of that 
stream of estimated inflows to the present value of the ARPA investment. One important 
caution to consider when comparing IRRs for different projects is that the method can
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lead to unreliable results. Because the projects' net present value profiles1 can cross, the 
IRR approach for comparing projects may lead to different answers, depending on the 
market interest rate used.
Alternatively, a market interest rate (which is known, in the case of ex-post 
evaluations) could be substituted for IRR in the above equation, with the dependent 
variable becoming the net present value. Then, the resulting equation could be solved for 
NPV:
n C J 7
n p v = y  --<■
s (  i + . * y
k = market interest rate
CFj = cash flow in period t 
The benefit of this calculation, over the IRR approach, is that the NPVs of various 
projects can be compared.
Like the ratio models, these approaches also ignore the contribution of other 
inputs (such as labor, capital, management structure, experience, etc.) by the weapon 
system producers. A third approach, using production functions, uses time-series data on 
capital, labor, and technology inputs to estimate the value of each input to the total 
output.
Q = f ( K ,L ,T )
Q = quantity or dollar-value of output 
K = capital input 
L = labor input 
T = technology input
1A net present value profile is simply a graphical representation of net present values versus vaiying 
interest rates. The rate at which two net present value profiles cross is called the crossover rate. At 
interest rates below the crossover rate, one project has the higher NPV, while at interest rates greater than 
the crossover rate, the other project has the higher NPV (Brigham and Gapenski 1994).
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Several assumptions must be made regarding the mathematical form of the transformation 
equation, but the positive side is that only time-series data on the dollar-value of output 
and the size o f labor, capital, and R&D expenditures are needed to estimate the marginal 
contribution of R&D to the organization's output (Link 1993).
Since such data are often available in the corporate arena, economic models may 
be quite useful to the firm. In the case of federally-funded research, however, a 
fundamental problem arises due to the lack of a readily-identifiable and measurable output. 
While a firm may limit its concern to the impact on profitability, for instance, the 
government must be concerned with the net impact on social welfare of its funded 
research (Stiglitz 1988). Hence, when such an approach is used to evaluate federal R&D 
evaluation, the independent variable often must be expressed in such vague terminology as 
"net social benefit." A similar approach (in terms of the forecasted variable) involves the 
use of consumer surplus analysis, which relies on an estimation of the future supply and 
demand for the commodity to be produced by the government expenditure. As one writer 
cautions, however, "with extremely uncertain future demand and supply curves, consumer 
surplus analysis, when used in the R&D context, rapidly degenerates into advanced 
quantitative guesswork" (Roessner 1993, 194). In ARPA's case, the problem is no less 
significant. The dependent variable cannot be expressed in terms of a monetary value. 
ARPA's research is not meant to improve profitability or market share, which are clearly 
measurable for the private firm, but to enhance the national defense posture, which is 
rather difficult to quantify. Due to this difficulty, "the use of quantitative methods to aid 
decisions involving applied research is expected to be more problematic, and limited, in 
government than in business" (RoesSner 1993, 183).
15
3. Bibliometrics
Bibliometrics is the study and analysis of scientific output using publication-based 
data. A common form of this approach involves citation counts, in which the number of 
citations of a certain research effort serves as a proxy for the importance of that research. 
Because publications are the media through which scientists share ideas, the more an 
article is cited, the more likely the research underlying the article has contributed to the 
advancement of knowledge. For this reason, article citations are best used in evaluating 
basic research (Melkers 1993). Considering, however, that only about 10 percent2 of its 
research is classified as basic research (Agres 1989), article citation is not likely to be the 
best approach for evaluating ARPA.
One simple, and related, approach to evaluating the productivity of an agency 
might be simply to count the number of patents it garners over a given time period. In 
theory, since patents serve to establish property rights, the more patents an agency 
generates, the more innovations it has produced. Unfortunately, such an approach would 
fail to convince critics such as Harvard Professor Manuel Trajtenberg, who writes, 
"patents exhibit an enormous variance in their 'importance' or 'value,' and hence, simple 
patent counts cannot be very informative o f innovative 'output'" (1990, 172). Instead, 
patent counts are merely an indicator of the amount of R&D inputs. Trajtenberg’s 
argument is that any agency, with a large enough staff and enough financial resources, can 
generate a collection of patents. Simply counting them, therefore, does not indicate the 
quality of the research funded or performed by the agency. Trajtenberg elaborates:
2 This 10 percent figure is based on a claim by Agres (1989,40) that basic research at DARPA totaled 
about $ 100 million of the agency's $ 1 billion budget. Whether this percentage has remained constant 
over time is not clear.
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...the mere counting of patents at any level of aggregation cannot possibly 
render good value indicators: simple patent counts assign a value of one to 
all patents by construction, whereas their true values exhibit a very large 
variance. Furthermore, there is substantial evidence to the effect that the 
distribution of patent values is highly skewed toward the low end, with a 
long and thin tail into the high-value side (1990, 173).
Griliches echoes this finding, citing European data which reveal that the majority of 
patents are of "no or little real value while at the same time a much smaller fraction of 
patents is associated with really large economic returns" (Griliches 1987, 31).
A more enlightened approach involves the use of patent citations. When a patent 
is issued, accompanying documentation lists a variety of pertinent information, including 
citations to previous patents on which the newly patented innovation builds. These 
citations then demonstrate the contribution made by the new patent. In other words, "the 
granting of the patent is a legal statement that the idea embodied in the patent represents a 
novel and useful contribution over and above the previous state of knowledge, as 
represented by the citations" (Jaffe 1993, 580). The idea behind patent citation analysis is 
that, while a patent in itself does not necessarily signify an important innovation, citations 
to that patent in other patent applications indicate that it is generating follow-on ideas. 
More citations to a given patent, then, indicate relatively greater impact (Melkers 1993). 
While this type of research was once too cumbersome to be practical, patent applications 
are now available electronically, making the technique more feasible. Sources of 
electronic patent applications include DIALOG and the PATDATA database, available 
through BRS (Trajtenberg 1990; Jaffe 1993).
Unfortunately, patent citation analysis is still relatively expensive. The DIALOG 
database, though accessible, is also proprietary and costs $90 per hour of access time. 
Other sources for patent information include commercial patent research services, such as
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CHI Research, which use their own proprietary databases. These sources exist primarily 
to serve the needs of those interested in obtaining new patents, a process which requires 
in-depth research into prior patents to determine the incremental contribution of the new 
patent. For those interested in patenting innovations to establish legal property rights, the 
cost of citation searches is justifiable as a cost o f doing business.' For academic research, 
on the other hand, the costs can be prohibitive.
The home page of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)3 will have a 
new feature, scheduled to become active on 9 November, 1995, which will provide free 
online access to over twenty years of patent bibliographic text data. According to Mr. Jim 
Hirabayashi, in the Information Products Office of the USPTO, the data will come from 
the front pages of the patent applications, and will contain such information as the patent 
number, issue date, filing date, title, inventor, city, state, assigned owner, patent 
classification code, examination information, name of legal representative, U.S. patents 
cited, foreign patents cited, other publications cited, an abstract, and Patent Cooperation 
Treaty information. The search engine is the same one currently used for the AIDS 
Patent Database,4 which also is available from the USPTO home page. At this time, the 
search engine is not very sophisticated, providing little capability for statistical analysis of 
patent citations (see Appendix B). Another project, led by Adam Jaffe at Harvard and 
funded by the NSF, is collecting information from USPTO and creating a database for 
researchers, though Hirabayashi did not think it would be available to the public.
Hirabayashi was skeptical that a search of patents for ARPA or DARPA references 
would be successful, because the patent owner is not identified to that level of detail. 
According to Hirabayashi, ARPA patents probably would be listed simply as DOD 




titles would be required. The USPTO does not perform patent citation analyses, and is 
therefore unable to provide any specific guidance, but Hirabayashi recommended 
researching the work of Francis Narin, of CHI Research, who has been very active in the 
field.
One caveat in using citation analysis is that it may be biased toward scientists 
doing mainstream research (Lindsey 1989). Those operating outside the mainstream are 
not likely to be cited very often unless their research produces breakthrough innovations 
which influence the mainstream. This is important to consider, because ARPA tends to 
work far outside the mainstream, and its innovations are primarily useful in the 
development and use of military weapon systems.5 Unless an ARPA innovation results in 
a spin-off, therefore, it may not create a significant number of patent citations. This 
situation would not, however, indicate that the innovation was any less important than 
innovations which gamer more patent citations. This caveat actually is applicable to 
evaluations of government labs, in general. According to Papadakis and Bozeman, 
because most government labs generate only one or two patents per year, "the substantial 
majority of R&D laboratories in the government system do not pass the germaneness or 
volume tests which would allow patents to be used meaningfully in R&D evaluation" 
(1993, 117).
4. Peer Review
Due to the difficulties and limitations associated with evaluating research using the 
previously-identified approaches, about half of the federal research laboratories choose to 
evaluate their own research programs with yet another method, peer review (Bozeman
1993). This method involves selecting a team of experts in the area to be evaluated, and
5 With the exception of its information processing work, which, arguably, has produced breakthrough 
innovations.
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bringing them together to review the research effort and evaluate it on several 
predetermined criteria. Traditionally, peer review has been used prior to the research, as a 
tool for evaluating potential research projects and selecting those to pursue. A common 
criticism of peer review in this context is that it often leads to selection of very 
conservative, low-risk projects (Friedman 1981; Squires 1986). One of the reasons for 
this is that individual reviewers "evaluate scientific contributions in relation to their own 
(very different) cognitive and social locations" (Martin and Irvine 1983, 76). In other 
words, reviewers are sometimes reluctant to give a good review to research which 
contradicts their own research or thinking. Obviously, low-risk, conservative projects are 
incongruous with the very nature of ARPA, so peer review should be used judiciously in 
the project-selection process at the agency. As an evaluation tool for completed or in­
progress projects, however, peer review may be the most logical choice. According to the 
Committee on Federal Laboratories Task Force on Performance Measures for Research 
and Development (1975), peer review is the "generally recognized best procedure for 
evaluating research and development" (Bozeman 1993, 83).
In addition to the problem mentioned above, peer review evaluation has a couple 
of other drawbacks. First, due to national security considerations, research at ARPA is 
extremely sensitive. This situation is similar to that faced by industrial laboratories. 
Because research performed by industrial labs is often proprietary, only about 17.5 percent 
of them use peer review to evaluate their own research (Bozeman 1993). Companies 
spend large sums of money on research to produce new products, and are thus averse to 
revealing their research findings to peers from outside their organizations. Similarly, 
ARPA must protect its research findings from foreign governments. Consequently, any 
peers selected to review ARPA research would need to possess the requisite security 
clearances. This being said, the security clearance problem is not necessarily a fatal
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stumbling block. Other federal researchers have the necessary clearances, as do many of 
the scientists employed by defense contractors.6
The second problem is actually more serious. Studies of Canadian R&D 
evaluations have revealed that those conducted prior to the 1980's generally served the 
interests of the researchers, not upper management. As a result, any research considered 
to be of good scientific quality was considered a success regardless of the outcome. 
Addressing this situation, in 1986, the Office of the Comptroller General of Canada 
(OCG) produced a Discussion Paper entitled Evaluations o f Research and Development 
Programs, which specified the issues to consider in such evaluations. As a result of this 
paper, in the late 1980s, Canadian government evaluations began to ask such questions as:
Do the research activities undertaken constitute a legitimate role for 
government at this time? Do the conditions that gave rise to the program 
still prevail? Are the objectives consistent with the current government 
policy priorities and goals? . . . Does the R&D program have a clearly 
defined clientele? To what extent are the clients satisfied that the R&D 
program is producing or is likely to produce results which will be useful to 
them? (Barbarie 1993, 158-9).
Questions such as these give the R&D programs more of a customer focus, increasing the
likelihood that research will be conducted with an end in mind, rather than simply for the
sake of science. The lesson for ARPA is that, when establishing peer review panels, the
criteria by which those panels will evaluate R&D effectiveness must be carefully
considered. "Good scientific quality" and interesting research are not acceptable
substitutes for revolutionary advances in the art of war.
6 Though another problem could be created by hiring peers who work for the very 
companies likely to compete for the resulting weapon systems
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Unfortunately, no studies exist which attempt to quantify ARPA's effectiveness at 
funding technology, and the agency itself does not maintain the requisite data even to 
attempt such a study. One ARPA official was able to provide such information as a list of 
directors and the annual budgets over time, but more specific information was not 
available, since the agency does not employ an historian, and has no procedure for 
collecting key management data. In the absence of an existing comprehensive assessment, 
and lacking the means to conduct such a study, an alternative is the analysis of unsolicited 
opinions of those who have written about ARPA in the public forum. Purists will not 
accept this as a real evaluation method, of course, due to its lack of scientific rigor, but 
without any other workable approach, some value must be credited to the opinions of 
experts and industry insiders. While ARPA has received praise from the press and from 
defense experts, the existence of admirers does not prove widespread respect. A 
reasonable proxy for the aggregate opinion of the defense industry may be gleaned, 
however, from a simple tally of the positive and negative opinions expressed in a sample of 
articles written about ARPA projects over the years. If, for instance, a thorough sampling 
of articles finds praise for a given project significantly more often than criticism, the 
project might reasonably be considered a success. Scouring the technical journals for 
mention of a given project and keeping a tally of the results might not be the most 
enjoyable of tasks, but it would provide interesting data for further research. Over time, 
after a significant number of the projects have been assigned peer acceptance ratings, the 
resulting database would either provide support for, or an argument against, claims that 
the agency has been a model of success. Obviously, such an approach lacks the scientific 
rigor of some other approaches, but it may be the best approach available at this time.
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These are just a few of the techniques available for evaluating R&D impacts. Only 
those most applicable to evaluating overall program effectiveness for an agency such as 
ARPA are presented here. A truly comprehensive evaluation, of course, is likely to 
require evaluations of the individual projects. One interesting technique involves the use 
of case studies, with the objective of tracing the pattern of events in the development of a 
technology (Kingsley 1993). This technique would be most useful in evaluating ARPA's 
role in a single innovation. For instance, ARPA directors often boast of their agency's 
role in the development of stealth technology. In reality, however, radar cross section 
(RCS) reduction techniques had been applied in the design of the Lockheed SR-71 
Blackbird in the 1950s. Additionally, the ideas for the stealth technology incorporated 
into the F-117 had been published by a Russian scientist prior to ARPA's involvement 
(Rich and Janos 1994). ARPA's role in stealth was basically limited to funding the 
technology demonstration programs which led to the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), B- 
2 bomber, and the F-117. To be sure, these were great technological accomplishments, 
but the breakthrough innovations actually occurred much earlier. In fact, using the case 
study method, one might be able to show that ARPA actually impeded the development of 
stealth by declining to fund its early pioneers (Van Atta, Reed, and Deitchman 1991).
Provided enough data could be located, textual databases could be used, in theory, 
to perform Co-Word analyses, and thereby trace research impacts. This is a technique 
which has become more promising with the advancement of computers and data-storage 
devices (Kostoff 1993a). In the case of ARPA and its research, however, the required 
data is too sparse. Because of this factor, and due to the large amount of groundwork 
required prior to engaging in Co-Word analysis, this technique will not be pursued here.
The researcher has a rather large selection of evaluation methods from which to 
choose. All have certain shortcomings, and are therefore likely to be indeterminate when
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used alone. Accordingly, "the greater the variety of measures used to evaluate research 
impact, the greater is the likelihood of converging to an accurate understanding of the 
knowledge produced by research" (KostofF 1993b, 164). Unfortunately, federal agencies 
rarely use multiple techniques to evaluate their research, but instead choose to stick to a 
single, favorite technique (KostofF 1993b). This circumstance may be due to the widely- 
held opinion that in-depth evaluations of R&D have not, to date, proven to be extremely 
useful or reliable. Until studies begin to reveal compelling justification for pursuing 
aggressive R&D evaluation, the situation is not likely to change. As a. result, making 
judgments about agency success in funding research and comparing one agency to another 
is often rather difficult and inconclusive.
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Chapter 3; History of ARPA
"I want an agency that makes sure no important thing remains undone because it doesn't 
fit somebody's mission." - Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy, 1958 (Gansler 1989, 238)
If American defense contractors were allowed to market their wares without 
restriction on the world market, the federal government probably would have little need 
for investing in defense R&D. Because of the intense competition among governments to 
field the most powerful militaries and the most sophisticated weapon systems, any 
innovation resulting in a military advantage would be tremendously valuable to the 
producer. Defense contractors would rush to invest in R&D and would compete for the 
top scientists necessary to develop such innovations. For obvious reasons, of course, the 
U.S. government is not willing to allow American companies unrestricted access to the 
world arms market. As a result, defense contractors operate within a monopsonistic 
market. They have, essentially, only one customer: the DOD. If they should develop a 
new weapon system or pertinent innovation on their own, they would be at the mercy of 
U.S. politicians to recoup their investment. Those elected officials might decide not to 
allocate the funds to purchase the firm's product, no matter how innovative it may be. The 
incentive to stay ahead in the international competition for military supremacy would not 
be enough to ensure the sale, because those same politicians could prevent the product 
from being sold to anyone else. Self-directed defense R&D is, therefore, extremely risky.7 
This is the reason why the federal government must fund organizations like ARPA, the 
Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the National Research Laboratories.
7 Northrop learned this lesson the hard way when they developed the F-20 Tigershark without a 
commitment by the Defense Department to buy the aircraft. Though the F-20 met the Air Force needs for 
a lightweight, inexpensive, single-seat fighter, Northrop was left holding the bag.
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ARPA was founded in 1958, in response to the Soviet launching of Sputnik. 
Separate from the three Service components, ARPA was to act as DOD's research arm 
and invest in high-risk, potentially high-payoff technology. In their 1991 report on 
DARPA, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) divided the agency's history into 3 
major periods (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991). From its beginning in 1958 
through the mid-1960s, ARPA enjoyed generous funding as it primarily concentrated on 
several large projects to which it had been directed by the Executive Branch. Once those 
programs became sufficiently mature to be transferred to other agencies, however, ARPA 
took on a completely new look. Real funding levels declined in the second period, which 
included the years from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. With the transfer of the 
"presidential issues," the agency gained the freedom to pursue projects of its own 
choosing, but lost much of its reason for being. The critical need for the agency became 
less obvious, and some even pushed to end its charter. In spite o f this erosion of status, 
however, the agency not only survived this uneasy period, but also produced some of its 
most important research in the area of computer science. The third period dates from the 
mid-1970s to the present, and witnesses rising budgets as the agency takes on several 
large high-risk projects, begins to indulge in programs seemingly outside of its charter, and 
is pulled in several new directions by politicians apparently intent on crafting industrial 
policy through selective appropriation.
From the start, ARPA concentrated on several large "presidential issues:" space, 
ballistic missile defense (BMD, the DEFENDER program), and nuclear test detection (the 
VELA program). These, after all, comprised the justification for forming the agency. 
Even in the formative years, however, ARPA funded ground-breaking research in 
computer science. In 1961, the predecessor to the agency's Information Processing 
Techniques Office (IPTO) was organized, and J.C.R Licklider was hired as the first
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director. Licklider had worked with Leo Beranek on speech problems at Harvard during 
World War II, and the two had later joined Richard Bolt and Robert Newman on the 
faculty at MIT. Those close ties continued when the group left MIT to form the 
consulting firm of Bolt, Beranek, and Newman (BBN), a company which would become 
ARPA's prime contractor in building ARPANET, the predecessor o f today's widely- 
renowned Internet. The mission of the EPTO was to build "Centers of Excellence" for 
basic research in computer science that would improve military command, control, and 
communications (C^). The first years of ARPA were a period of generous funding, since 
the executive branch had high expectations for its chosen projects (Flamm 1987).
The mid-1960s through the mid-1970s marked a distinctly different period. 
During these years, ARPA transferred the civilian space programs to NASA, and most 
military space programs to the Services. It also transferred DEFENDER to the Army, 
leaving VELA and the new AGILE program, which funded counter-insurgency R&D for 
the war in Vietnam, as the only remaining "presidential" projects. These transfers marked 
major transitions (DEFENDER alone had consumed 40-50 percent of the total budget 
from 1965-67) and left significant holes in the fabric of ARPA (Van Atta, Deitchman, and 
Reed 1991). The program reductions did, however, provide the opportunity for a number 
of new exploratory research programs in such diverse areas as computer processing, 
behavioral science, and advanced materials. With a 1965 computer research budget of 
$14 million, which grew by 1973 to $39 million, ARPA (renamed DARPA in 1972) 
funded research in such areas as computer graphics, display systems, interactive 
computing and timesharing systems, and artificial intelligence (AI). In 1962, ARPA had 
negotiated a large-scale contract for an MIT-based project with a timeshare focus. Project 
MAC (Multiple Access Computer/Machine Aided Cognition) initially was funded at $2 
million per year, with that amount increasing to $4.3 million in 1969 and remaining as high
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as $3 million in 1973. DARPA became the Defense Department's dominant source of 
computer research and development in the 1970s, and led the world in its timesharing 
research. According to Kenneth Flamm, "of 12 general-purpose timesharing systems 
catalogued in a 1967 survey article, six . . . were sponsored by DARPA" (1987, 58).
The early research into timesharing systems laid the foundation for follow-on 
research on networks and the establishment in 1969 of ARPANET. For the initial study of 
the basic concepts of "packet-switched communications," DARPA had again turned to 
MIT (Flamm 1987). Work on ARPANET began in 1966, when Robert Taylor, a former 
director of ARPA's computer research program and partner in Bolt, Beranek, and 
Newman, asked the ARPA director for money to pursue the idea. Immediately, $1 million 
was transferred into the ARPANET project, with BBN as the prime contractor. In 1968, 
Taylor joined original IPTO Director Licklider in writing an influential paper suggesting 
that computers could serve as communications devices, and envisioning a computer 
network "that would create new communities of scientists separated by geography but 
united by technology" (Kantrowitz and Rogers 1994, 57).
Though overall funding levels from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s were fairly 
constant in nominal terms (figure 1), inflation caused a steady decline in the real 
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Figure 2: DARPA Budget (1990 $)
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The declining real budgets were the result of uncertainty about the mission of the 
agency, following completion of some of the "presidential" programs. Some people 
believed ARPA had served its purpose and no longer needed to exist. Fearing the agency 
would become unfocused after completing its initial projects, Congress emphasized the 
need for joint Service-ARPA programs and passed the 1972 Mansfield Amendment, which 
further emphasized the importance of ARPA sticking to defense-specific research. In fact, 
this emphasis was reflected in the addition of "Defense" to the agency's name in 1972, 
creating DARPA (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991).
The third major period dates from the mid-1970s to the present, and involves large 
projects in several high-risk areas, many of which were outgrowths of the earlier 
exploratory research. Within the third period, three sub-periods also are apparent. From 
1975 to 1977, DARPA, under the leadership of Dr. George Heilmeier, launched several 
new large-scale demonstration projects, such as STEALTH, Space-based infrared 
surveillance (TEAL RUBY), standoff follow-on forces attack (ASSAULT BREAKER), 
and experimental aircraft (X-29, X-Wing). In an effort to prevent these large-scale 
programs from completely absorbing the agency's resources, Dr. Heilmeier separated them 
into a separate office called the Experimental Evaluation of Major Innovative 
Technologies (EEMIT). Dr. Robert Fossum became the DARPA Director in 1977, and 
although he was concerned about all the technology demonstration projects launched by 
his predecessor, he was stuck with them (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991).
In 1981, Dr. Robert Cooper took over as Director and, following the previous 
pattern, began transferring many of the EEMIT programs (STEALTH, ASSAULT 
BREAKER, TEAL RUBY, X-29) to the Services. He eliminated other, less promising 
EEMIT programs.8 Simultaneously, the Strategic Technologies Office (STO), created in
8 No information is available concerning which projects were eliminated.
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the early 1970s to pursue several small, exploratory-research projects, was transferred to 
the newly-formed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), along with several related EEMIT 
projects. In total, the programs transferred to SDI represented about 25 percent of 
DARPA's budget. In place of these projects, DARPA launched several new aviation and 
naval technology programs and gave birth to the Strategic Computing Program, an effort 
to leverage computing advances into defense applications. From 1986 to the present, 
DARPA transferred several more key programs to other agencies, as Dr. Cooper 
attempted to re-focus the agency on technology research, rather than system 
demonstration. Under Dr. Cooper's leadership, ARPA devoted funds to increased 
research on undersea warfare and a new program, LIGHTSAT, to develop small satellites 
for tactical Command, Control and Communications (C^). Meanwhile, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) introduced an entirely new focus, defense manufacturing, and 
assigned DARPA several new "productivity-" oriented programs, such as the 
semiconductor manufacturing consortium (SEMATECH), microwave/millimeter-wave 
monolithic integrated circuit chips MIMIC, and Software Technology for Adaptable 
Reliable Systems (STARS) (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed, 1991). Though justified as a 
means of reducing the cost of future weapon systems, these programs were (and are) 
extremely controversial, due to their weak fit with ARPA's mission and their striking 
resemblance to de facto industrial policy/corporate welfare.
Continuing this trend of expanding the role of ARPA, in the Defense Conversion, 
Reinvestment, and Transition Assistance Act of 1993, the Clinton Administration 
introduced the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP). The TRP is managed by an 
oversight committee called the Defense Technology Conversion Council, which consists 
of ARPA, the Department of Energy/Defense Programs (DOE/DP), the Department of 
Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the National
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Science Foundation (NSF), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA). Demonstrating its admiration, the Administration selected ARPA to chair that 
council. The goals of TRP include softening the blow of the defense draw-down on small 
businesses and reconsidering military specifications to allow cheaper, commercially- 
available components to be used in weapon systems when possible. While reasonable 
arguments may be made in support of such an effort, the selection of ARPA to lead it 
seems to demonstrate either a lack of understanding or a willful neglect of the agency's 
strengths.
Historically, according to Agres, about half of the ideas for DARPA-sponsored 
research come from outside the agency, with the rest originating at DARPA. Research is 
concentrated in several key areas, with about 10 percent of the projects classified as basic 
research. Consistent with its roots, ARPA is still a major player in computer science 
research. In fact, as of 1989, ARPA supported the education of almost half of the 
American graduate students in computer science (Agres 1989, 40).9
9 This statistic probably does not hold true today. Though the 1994 Defense Appropriations Bill increased 
funding for ARPA's Computing Systems and Communications Technology program by $426 million, it 
also directed a $900 million cut in the program's university research funding.
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Chapter 4: Difficulties in Quantifying ARPA's Success
Though few can dispute the noted accomplishments o f ARPA, quantifying its 
overall success is rather difficult, as explained in Chapter 2. The mission of ARPA is to 
fund advanced research with a potential for high payoff for the Department of Defense, to 
keep America's armed forces on the forefront of technology. From that perspective, to the 
extent ARPA can take credit for America's military preeminence, it has been quite 
successful, at least in terms of accomplishing its mission. Assessing its efficiency, 
however, is more difficult. Though many defense experts have credited ARPA as a 
success in funding innovative technologies, they have failed to make the case that the 
agency has done so in an efficient manner. How much, for instance, is stealth technology 
worth to the United States? How many dollars worth of security does that technology 
provide? Without answers to such questions, we cannot assess definitively whether the 
results of research funded by ARPA warrant the costs of funding the agency.
Perhaps due to the difficulty of answering these questions, ARPA's supporters 
often judge its success based on the commercial payoffs from its defense research. 
Justifying the agency's existence solely by the value of its research to the commercial 
sector is, however, a risky approach. As Fortune writer Bruce Steinberg notes,
Military-industrial policy is not particularly efficient. Soldiers aside, 
defense spending will create around 1.2 million jobs between now and 
1987. But economists calculate that the same investment in the civilian 
economy could produce roughly 25% more jobs (1984, 42).
The writer was arguing, not that government should invest in the civilian economy instead
of in national defense, but that expenditures on defense should be based on national
security requirements, not on the potential economic benefits of those expenditures.
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Implied is the argument that government should leave economic investment to the private 
sector, where risk and return considerations determine the allocation of financial 
resources.
Even ignoring the above argument, the approach of quantifying ARPA's success by 
the value of its programs to the commercial sector is impractical, due to measurement 
difficulties. One problem is that "programs that some have tagged as 'failures,' others 
have seen as major accomplishments. Some of the 'failures' may have had significant 
influence elsewhere, while some 'successes' may have had little downstream effect" (Van 
Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991,1-1,2).
Another problem is the difficulty of determining what might have happened 
without ARPA funding. This line of reasoning gets into the idea of premature industries. 
A premature industry, according to University of Chicago economist Robert Fogel (1960), 
is one in which the public and private interests are not united. Investment in such an 
industry comes from the public coffers because the private sector does not yet see the 
opportunity for profitable investment, given the perceived level of risk. By this definition, 
the computer industry was a premature industry. Although the Department of Defense, 
through the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the National Security Agency (NSA) 
funded most of the early (through 1950s) research in computer science, and ARPA 
continued the high level of funding throughout the 1960s and 70s, that fact does not mean 
the industry developed purely because of government funding. All that is known is that, 
as a result of ARPA and other DOD agency funding, the computer industry developed 
sooner than it otherwise would have. Certainly, the early years of the computer industry 
were dominated by the demands of the Defense Department. The private sector did not 
yet see the value of investing in this area, as is reflected by the fact that many of the early 
computer firms went out of business when their government funding dried up (Flamm
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1987). Could this indicate that the industry developed at the expense of other industries, 
which could have benefited more from the research dollars? Critics of "big government" 
think so. Unfortunately, an objective answer to that question is unlikely, due to the 
number of assumptions which must be made prior to answering it. Even without 
government funding, however, most would agree the computer industry eventually would 
have emerged.
The most extensive study of the impacts of ARPA's research was conducted by the 
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), under DARPA contract. DARPA was approaching 
its thirtieth anniversary and wanted to document the impact of its research in those first 
thirty years. In this study, IDA collected all the information it could find on a list of 55 
ARPA projects. The first two volumes of the study contain histories of each of the 
projects, while the third volume attempts to draw conclusions concerning the impact of 
ARPA's research agenda. Overall, the study is very complimentary of ARPA's 
accomplishments, though because of its broad scope, no attempt is made to analyze the 
efficiency of any of the projects.
A few sources of bias also are apparent. The first is due to the close relationship 
' between ARPA and IDA. When ARPA was established, its original staff came directly 
from IDA. In the years following, ARPA worked directly with IDA on some of its 
projects.10 For IDA, therefore, to criticize ARPA, especially in its formative years, would 
mean criticizing itself. The second source of bias is due simply to the stated purpose of 
the study. DARPA paid IDA to document the impacts it had made over its first thirty 
years, and to draw out recommendations for the future. Had IDA criticized DARPA too 
strongly and minimized the impact of its research, its report is unlikely to have been
10 Such as a 1984 basic technology program to deal with infrared signature reduction, and the ADA 
common programming language development effort (Van Atta 1991, 10-6, 15-6).
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viewed as an acceptable product. A third source of possible bias is found in the project- 
selection process employed by IDA:
The projects studied were selected by the IDA project team and DARPA 
management working together, based on two criteria: (a) their importance, 
judged on the basis of evidence in attestation and documentation; and (b) 
the expected availability of data. The data available would have to contain 
sufficient information to permit elucidation of DARPA's role and 
contribution, tracing the paths of technical events through ultimate use, 
assessment of the impact and spin-offs of the output, and clear enough 
records to permit evaluation of lessons learned from the outcome (Reed 
1990, 3).
Not only did the IDA researchers work with DARPA management to determine 
which projects would be considered, but they even used as a baseline the project list 
management had prepared on the occasion of DARPA's twenty-fifth anniversary 
celebration. The two criteria mentioned above should have guaranteed that only the most 
successful projects were selected, since they both would tend to make the baseline list 
even more biased toward successful projects. The first criterion, that the projects be 
judged important, on the basis of documented evidence, biases the project list to the most 
successful projects because they are the ones most likely to be publicized and considered 
important. The second criterion, data availability, is understandable from the perspective 
of the researchers, but is, nevertheless, equally biasing. IDA had to rely on the data 
provided by DARPA. The likelihood of the agency providing more data on its successes 
than its failures only stands to reason.
To estimate the potential project-selection bias, please refer to Appendix A. This 
appendix is the result of a project-by-project enumeration of the amount of DARPA 
investment in each, as reported in the IDA study. In the first volume and through about 
half o f the second volume, the investment figures are provided in the summary section for 
each project. About halfway through the second volume, however, the figures become
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more difficult to identify. For those projects missing investment figures, or with 
incomplete figures, estimates are found in the column to the right of the investment 
figures. The far-right column in Appendix A notes any assumptions. The study 
documents about $3.7 billion in investment. Including several generous estimates, that 
figure rises to about $5.2 billion. Comparing these numbers to the total DARPA budgets 
from 1958 to 1988 (approximately $11.7 billion), the projects reviewed in the IDA study 
represent between thirty-two and forty-four percent of DARPA's total budgets. Certainly, 
these estimates leave ample room for project selection bias. Nevertheless, the study is 
impressive in scope and may be quite useful as a starting point for follow-on analysis.
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Chapter 5: The Secrets of ARPA's Success
Whatever the truth about the agency's absolute measure of success, anecdotal 
evidence (i.e., the list of successful projects the agency has funded, and the opinions of 
noted defense and research experts) suggests that ARPA has been more successful at 
funding technology than other government agencies. Agres called DARPA a 
governmental role model for funding technology and remarked, "in the corporate world, 
they would be venture capitalists, and highly successful ones at that" (Agres 1989, 39). 
According to the IDA study, ARPA's success has been made possible by eight primary 
strengths (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991):
1. Small size in relation to the size of its work programs
2. Flat organizational structure
3. Program managers (PMs) are empowered to make decisions and commit agency funds
4. Contracting is performed through the Services
5. Ability to access the entire U.S. technical community
6. Rotation of highly-qualified personnel
7. Ability to attract good people to manage its programs
8. Mix of civilian and military staff
Another, less comprehensive study of the agency was conducted by Michael Davey 
of the Congressional Research Service (CRS), and identified a similar list of factors 
responsible for ARPA's success (1993):
1. Small staff
2. Flat organizational structure
3. Program managers are given the authority to fund or terminate projects
4. Two-thirds of ARPA's contracts are administered by the Services
5. Ability to access the entire U.S. technical community
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6. Ability to make quick decisions to fund innovative ideas
7. Few rules and regulations
8. Usually funds a project only long enough to determine its feasibility
9. Large research budget
My own review of the literature on ARPA led me to select eight readily- 
identifiable factors which have led to ARPA's success: (1) funding research is job one, (2) 
ARPA does not perform its own research, (3) small size o f the agency, (4) the rotation of 
highly-qualified personnel, (5) dedication to a single customer: DOD, (6) authority to 
focus on high-risk research, (7) freedom from micro management, and (8) concentration 
of resources on Centers of Excellence.
1. Funding Research is Job One
According to its official mission statement (as of 1991), ARPA exists to:
1. Pursue imaginative and innovative research and development projects 
offering significant military utility.
2. Manage and direct the conduct of basic and applied research and 
development projects that exploit scientific breakthroughs and demonstrate 
the feasibility of revolutionary approaches for improved cost and 
performance of advanced technology for future applications (Van Atta,
Reed, and Deitchman 1991, V-3).
Funding research has been ARPA's only function over most of its existence. Other 
agencies fund research "on the side," as an additional function. Traditionally, ARPA has 
done nothing but fimd research. This setup has minimized distractions and allowed ARPA 
to be very selective, concentrating on funding the best research possible. As a result, 
ARPA typically funds only about 5 percent of the proposals submitted from outside the 
agency, while other federal agencies fund 30-40 percent of proposed research projects.
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ARPA even has been able to avoid a significant amount of administrative overhead by 
delegating two-thirds of its contract administration responsibilities to the Services (Davey 
1993). As a result of this intense concentration on its narrow mission, ARPA has had the 
opportunity to become quite proficient at spotting the research programs with the most 
promise.
2. ARPA Does Not Perform Its Own Research
ARPA has no labs of its own. The agency merely administers funds. It may fund 
research at universities, at industrial laboratories, or at government laboratories. As a 
result, ARPA has the flexibility to fund the most promising research in the country, 
without organizational or geographical bounds. In contrast, other defense-related 
research and development efforts take place within government laboratories. If those labs 
wish to pursue research outside their areas of expertise, they must either try to hire the top 
researchers from the private sector (which is often difficult, given the compensation gap 
between what industry or academia can offer and what government can offer), or attempt 
to conduct the research with their own resources, which may not be sufficient.
3. Small Size
"Large hierarchical organizations tend to be remarkably efficient mechanisms for the 
suppression of new ideas and alternatives." - Former Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger (Gansler 1989, 218)
Public Choice theory, explained in the Introduction, is equally applicable to the 
behavior of politicians at the agency level. Although these government, officials generally 
are not permitted to use their positions to enhance their own financial status, they are
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often quite amenable to serving their own self-interests in other ways. One way is by 
continually increasing their respective agencies' budgets and staffs, while simultaneously 
expanding their roles and missions, thereby increasing the individual bureaucrat's sphere of 
influence. This sort of behavior, sometimes labeled "empire building," leads to layer upon 
layer o f bureaucracy being added to organizations over time. In contrast, ARPA has 


























































Figure 3: ARPA Organizational Structure
(ARPA Home Page, http://www.arpa.mil)
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Thirty-seven years after its creation, the agency still employs less than 200 staff* 
members, with about half of them serving as program managers (Kitfield 1990). Each of 
the program managers is responsible for a $10 to $50 million block of funds, with about 
80 percent allocated for a single project or set of projects (Davey 1993). Although the 
agency commands an impressive overall budget of about $1.5 billion, DARPA's combined 
budgets from 1958 to 1990 still fell short of DOD's single year budget for research, 
development, testing, and evaluation (Kitfield 1990). This relatively small size fosters low 
overhead costs and limits bureaucracy. Asked whether DARPA could expand in size and 
take on more responsibilities, controversial former director Craig Fields replied, '"no, 
DARPA can't get much larger in personnel and in budget and still be effective" (Agres 
1989, 42). This is notable, considering the widely-held opinion that Fields lost his position 
at ARPA due to his efforts to expand the agency's mission. Despite his zeal to get involved 
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4. Rotation of Highly-Qualified Personnel
"There is nothing more important... The technical people are solid. They have 
international reputations in their fields. Their personality is to be entrepreneurs." - Craig 
Fields, Former Director, ARPA (Agres 1989, 42)
One plausible reason why ARPA directors have avoided the quest for power in 
terms of increasing staff and budgets is that few of them have stayed around long enough 
to benefit from such power (see Table I). The phenomenon of relatively short tenures is 
true throughout the organization. Due to its prestige, ARPA is able to attract some of the 
brightest minds in the country, from industry, academia, and government, at the height of 
their careers. Most of the engineers are in their 30s and 40s. Many even accept a 
reduction in pay to work for the government agency. These employees have current 
knowledge and fresh ideas for innovative research. They generally come to ARPA for an 
average stay of 3 to 5 years and then return to their previous employers (Agres 1989). As 
explained in the IDA study:
DARPA has been seen as a place where one can see things done and make 
things happen with a freedom that is rare in either government or industry.
In contrast, in academic research the freedom is there, but not the funding 
and organizational wherewithal. Thus, DARPA has been highly attractive 
for the technological entrepreneur with a strong vision and desire to 
achieve (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991, V-7).
Because they do not stay long and because they are so intent on "getting things done,"
ARPA's employees do not have time to "build empires" and become entrenched in
bureaucracy.
Director From To Years
Johnson, Roy N. 7 Feb 58 13 Nov 59 18
Betts, Austin W. 8 Dec 59 15 Jan 61 1.1
Ruina, Jack P. 16 Jan 61 5 Jul 63 2.5
Sproull, Robert L. 3 Sep 63 4 Jun 65 1.8
Herzfeld, Charles M. 6 Jun 65 30 May 67 2.0
Rechtin, Eberhardt 21 Nov 67 26 Dec 70 3.1
Lukasik, Stephen 11 Apr 71 17 Dec 74 3.7
Heilmeier, George H. 5 Mar 75 3 Dec 77 2.8
Fossum, Robert R. 4 Dec 77 5 Apr 81 3.3
Cooper, Robert 29 Jul 81 11 Jul 85 4.0
Duncan, Robert C. 18 Nov 85 21 Dec 87 2.1
Colladay, Raymond S. 31 Jan 88 28 Apr 89 1.2
Fields, Craig I. 1 May 89 6 May 90 1.0
Reis, Victor H. (acting) 7 May 90 12 Nov 90 0.5
Reis, Victor H. 13 Nov 90 3 Dec 91 1.1
Denman, Gary L. (acting) 4 Dec 91 14 Mar 92 0.3
Denman, Gary L. 15 Mar 92 3 Mar 95 3.0
Lynn, Larry (acting) 14 Mar 95 present
Table I: Tenures of ARPA Directors (Source: ARPA, unpublished)
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5. One Customer: DOD
ARPA has focused on a single customer, the Department of Defense. This 
customer focus, along with the practice of funding only that research which holds promise 
for satisfying the needs of the Defense Department, is extremely important in explaining 
the development of the computer industry. Even before ARPA, the Defense Department 
funded most of the research in computer science. The reason for this funding was that the 
military had identified very real needs for computers, such as calculating ballistic 
trajectories in World War II. This kind of involvement is very different from targeting 
technologies. Government involvement in promoting the computer industry had nothing 
to do with selecting a technology for the private sector or boosting American 
competitiveness. Technology targeting, on the other hand, involves selecting technologies 
or supporting scientific research in the hope that something useful might be produced for 
someone. The idea that research aimed at solving identifiable problems is more likely to 
be fruitful than research funded to produce something of potential use for a group of 
unknown customers with unknown problems only stands to reason.
Another benefit of the concentration on one customer is that it reduces the 
difficulty of selecting projects to fund. Other agencies, such as the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) must fund research without a 
specific customer because they exist only to support scientific research. To prioritize 
numerous proposals, they must rely on the peer review system, by which a panel of 
experts in the particular field judge the merit o f competing projects. One of the criticisms 
of the peer review process is that it often stifles innovation (Friedman 1981). Research 
which threatens currently-held beliefs may be seen as a threat by the panel members. 
These reviewers, who are usually engaged in their own research, have a personal interest 
in the outcome of the peer review process. ARPA does not have to worry about this
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problem because it makes its own decisions about which projects to fund, based on its 
knowledge of its one and only customer. Though program managers at DARPA may use 
peer review as a tool to help prioritize potential projects, the final decision is the 
responsibility of the program managers. The distinction is that ARPA, on the basis of 
clear objectives, purchases its research. Purchased research involves a quid pro quo 
relationship, which leads to a mutually-beneficial exchange. Supported research does not 
involve such a relationship, since the supporter is, in effect, a third party to the transaction, 
and does not understand the needs of its undefined customer (Martino 1992).
6. Authority to Focus on High-Risk Research
ARPA traditionally has maintained a tightly-focused objective, to fund advanced 
technology and thereby exploit technological opportunities which the rest of DOD has 
overlooked. While other agencies may shy away from innovative research due to fear of 
failure or the problems caused by the peer review process, ARPA's focus on high-risk, 
advanced research often pushes it toward high-payoff, innovative technology. 
Undoubtedly, the agency has funded many failures along the way (though its directors 
rarely talk about them), but it also has funded some spectacular successes. ARPA has 
been allowed to accept some failures because uncertainty is the very nature of research. 
The research effort attempts to remove the veil of uncertainty to reveal whether or not any 
opportunities for valuable development exist. ARPA is exposed to greater-than-normal 
risks because it seeks out innovations capable of revolutionizing the nature of warfare and 
giving American forces a distinctive edge. In fact, ARPA is the only federal agency with 
the mission of delving into such high-risk research (Agres 1989). Similar to financial
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investments, technological investments also require a high degree of risk to achieve 
higher-than-normal returns.
7. Freedom From Micromanagement
"All DARPA does is fund research. But DARPA officials carefully select R&D projects, 
and then they nurture them with ample funding and little bureaucratic intervention or 
micromanagement" (Agres 1989, 39).
Traditionally, politicians have not interfered with ARPA's day-to-day operations. 
One factor which has provided the agency this freedom from micromanagement is the 
high-level of secrecy afforded many of ARPA's research projects. In most government- 
funded research, bureaucracy is inevitable, because government must account for how 
taxpayers' money is spent. For this reason, federal funding usually results in a large 
amount of paperwork and micromanagement. Another factor leading to this political 
involvement is the fact that legislators have an incentive to associate their own names with 
popular research so they may receive credit for that research (Martino 1992). Because 
ARPA's projects are often so highly classified, few people outside the agency know what 
projects are being funded, and are thus prevented from interfering. Indeed, former ARPA 
director Robert Cooper comments, "DARPA probably has the largest pot o f unrestricted 
money in the government or even in industry to [fund research]. That's where its power 
lies" (Perry 1991, 65).
In addition to freedom from political micromanagement, Project Managers at 
ARPA have great latitude within the organization to make final decisions about funding 
and terminating projects. Working under very few rules and regulations, they have the 
authority to award money very quickly to those ideas they believe are promising (Davey 
1993).
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8. Concentration of Resources on Centers of Excellence
ARPA concentrates its resources on key areas in a few major research 
organizations with proven capabilities. This factor is closely related to the point 
mentioned earlier, that ARPA does not perform its own research. The authority of the 
organization to focus its resources so tightly is also related to the situation mentioned 
above, that the agency has remained relatively free from micromanagement. All too often, 
in other areas of government appropriation, politicians threaten to prevent certain projects 
from being pursued unless funds are allocated "equitably" across state lines and 
congressional districts. As a result, work is not always assigned to the most capable 
organization, but is instead allocated on the basis of political influence.
Artificial Intelligence research provides an example of the difference in ARPA 
funding procedures. ARPA always has been a major supporter of artificial intelligence. In 
fact, it typically has supplied about 55% of all government funding in this area. Even 
while disbursing these large sums of research money, however, the agency has 
concentrated its grants in a few major Centers of Excellence: Bolt, Beranek and Newman 
(BBN), Camegie-Mellon University, MIT, Stanford University, SRI International, and 
Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center (Flamm 1987).
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Chapter 6: Dangerous Trends
Despite the past successes of ARPA, the agency's future effectiveness may be in 
jeopardy. Shortly after the advent of pork-barrel funding for science, Congress began to 
look at ARPA as a new political playground. Politicians, impressed by the apparent 
success of the agency and, no doubt, by its sizable budget, began thinking of new jobs for 
ARPA. As in the story about the goose that laid the golden eggs, the results of this 
tinkering are threatening the health of ARPA, and may bring an end to 37 years of 
innovative research. Mirroring some of the historical strengths of the agency, several 
important weaknesses are now identifiable.
1. Funding Research is Only One of the Jobs - The SEMATECH Case
The 1986 Discussion Paper by the Office of the Comptroller General of Canada 
concerning evaluation of federal R&D established, among other things, "that quality of 
research work, while necessary, is not a sufficient condition for federal R&D program 
effectiveness, and that to be effective, quality research must be pursued in the context of a 
clearly defined and relevant purpose" (Barbarie 1993, 157). This is significant because, in 
addition to funding basic and applied research, ARPA, in its third period, has become 
heavily involved in other activities, such as govemment-industry consortia, prototype 
demonstrations, manufacturing methods, and manufacturing engineering education. This 
shift has occurred, not by accident, but by design. Indeed, President Clinton released a 
report in September 1992 which called for "reforming federal research and development 
programs to focus on critical technologies," and "leveraging the existing federal 
investment in technology to maximize its contribution to industrial performance" (Lee 
1992, 59). The purpose of the agency no longer seems so "clearly defined and relevant" 
as it once was.
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The consortiurr. of Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology, SEMATECH, 
became one of ARPA’s most significant projects in the third period of its history, and the 
forerunner of a new focus for the agency. As mentioned earlier, SEMATECH was 
justified as a means of reducing the cost of future weapon systems (Van Atta, Deitchman, 
and Reed 1991). The real purpose of this consortium, however, was no secret. The 
American semiconductor industry was in trouble in 1987. Less than 40 percent of the 
equipment used to make computer chips was being produced in America (Pope 1993b). 
The original fourteen industrial members of SEMATECH could have established the 
consortium on their own, given that anti-trust laws had been relaxed (Steinberg 1984). If 
government support was justified, then the government could have appropriated the funds 
in the form of a series of grants or loans. The Chrysler Corporation bailout could have 
been cited as a precedent for such an action. Instead, ARPA was forced to foot half the 
bill for an industry-govemment consortium dedicated to propping up the American 
semiconductor industry. This project stands in stark contrast to previous DARPA 
involvement in computer science research. When DOD funded key research in the early 
years of the computer industry, it was basically the only player. Almost no one else was 
interested in using computers, so very little private-sector research money was available. 
If DOD was to get the computers it needed, it was forced to pay for the research. Such 
was not the case in 1987, and is not the case today. DOD, though admittedly a major 
customer,11 now is only one of many customers o f the computer industry.
Then DARPA director Craig Fields justified his agency’s involvement in 
SEMATECH by pointing to the frightening possibility of all the American computer chip 
manufacturers going out of business (Charles 1989). American weaponry is so reliant on
11 According to Charles, "The Pentagon buys more than $4 billion dollars worth of semiconductors each 
year, about 27 percent of the industry's total U.S. production. Overall, electronics account for 36 percent 
of the Pentagon's $38 billion R&D budget and 17 percent of the total defense budget" (1989).
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computers that our wartime effectiveness depends in large extent on the availability of 
semiconductors. If the American semiconductor industry should fold, reasoned Fields, the 
U.S. would be forced to rely on semiconductor shipments from Japan and other countries. 
Not only would such extended supply lines be undesirable, due to the reduction in 
timeliness, but the situation also would leave U.S. war-fighting capability vulnerable to 
attacks on other countries or on the supply lines themselves. This scenario does warrant 
some concern. Unfortunately, while the American government may have the noblest of 
intentions, such intervention recalls similar attempts by the British to prop up their airline 
industry. They and others have failed miserably at resurrecting struggling industries. 
Whether the government should have gotten involved in rescuing the American computer 
chip industry is, at best, questionable. In any event, industrial safety nets are definitely 
outside the purview of ARPA.
The fact is, SEMATECH was not intended to solve critical national defense 
problems with advanced research, but to prop up the American computer chip industry by 
subsidizing the industry's R&D efforts. This fact was confirmed when the consortium's 
chief executive, Robert Noyce, explained, "the first requirement of success is that it 
(SEMATECH) be industry-driven. The industry spends far more time and effort thinking 
about what needs to be done to promote its competitiveness than any other entity, so why 
wouldn't you believe its conclusion?" (Charles 1989, 18). Mr. Noyce is absolutely right. 
The industry should decide for itself what needs to be done to improve its 
competitiveness. That question should not be answered by the Defense Department. The 
industry also should determine how much investment is appropriate to stimulate that 
competitiveness and commit its own funds. Otherwise, the industry will not be able to 
conduct a proper risk versus return analysis, and will have less incentive to succeed on its 
own merits.
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Several of SEMATECH's original fourteen members became disillusioned with the 
consortium and withdrew their membership during 1992 and 1993. LSI Logic 
Corporation announced its withdrawal in January 1992, citing a fundamental disagreement 
about the direction of the consortium, and concerns that SEMATECH was not the best 
place to invest its limited R&D dollars. LSI's disagreement was with the SEMATECH 
practice of granting money directly to the companies which produce computer chip 
manufacturing equipment. SEMATECH supporters pointed to LSI's shaky financial 
situation to minimize the significance of the withdrawal (Yamada 1992a), but could not 
make the same argument a week later, when Micron Technology, Inc. announced that it 
too was leaving SEMATECH. Micron was doing well financially, but cited the same 
concerns about the strategic direction o f SEMATECH. A company spokesman said 
Micron "had hoped the consortium would focus more on ways to make advanced chips" 
(Yamada 1992b, A8) instead of funneling money into the pockets of the makers of 
computer chip manufacturing equipment. As Micron chairman and CEO Joseph 
Parkinson explained, "Sematech has gotten off the track of its original mission to develop 
the production process" (ibid.).
Coincident with Micron's announcement, Harris Corporation had announced it, 
too, was considering withdrawing from SEMATECH. A company spokesman at the time 
noted that Harris intended to stay a member as long as the returns from its SEMATECH 
membership justified the required investment (Yamada 1992b). A year later, in January of 
1993, Harris Corporation announced that it had, indeed, withdrawn from SEMATECH 
(Pope 1993a). Simultaneously, other members began pressing the consortium to "align its 
research more closely with their own projects" (ibid.) instead of handing out their dues to 
the equipment manufacturers. In such a competitive industry, companies struggled to 
justify giving their resources over to the consortium. In fact, SEMATECH had almost
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lost another member, Rockwell International Corporation, in 1992, because of the poor 
retum-on-investment performance statistics the company had generated. To prevent this 
occurrence, SEMATECH had "launched an entire new research program to keep 
Rockwell in the fold" (Pope 1992).
More bad news for SEMATECH arrived in an August 1992 Government 
Accounting Office (GAO) report, which announced the decision by the Defense 
Department to begin pulling its own money out of SEMATECH in 1993. Ten of the 
twelve SEMATECH members told the GAO they would not increase their own dues to 
make up for the loss of Defense funding. Though Craig Fields and other supporters of the 
consortium argued for the need to continue federal funding, the justification was hard to 
find. American producers of computer chip manufacturing equipment had experienced a 
significant turnaround in the early 1990s. By early 1993, they controlled a 53 percent 
share of the world market, up from less than 40 percent in 1987 (Pope 1993b). Thus, the 
true goal of SEMATECH appeared to have been accomplished, and the consortium no 
longer appeared to need the large federal subsidy.
Irrespective of SEMATECH's need for the federal subsidy, in April 1993 it gained 
a partial replacement for its former patron. The Energy Department announced, on April 
7, a five-year agreement worth $103 million to help the consortium continue funding the 
equipment manufacturers {Wall Street Journal 1993). The following year, in October, 
SEMATECH proudly announced a plan to "wean itself from its $90 million annual federal 
appropriation" (McCartney 1994, B6). The plan called for removing DOD funding after 
the 1997 fiscal year. No mention was made of the status of the Energy Department 
funding, though SEMATECH director Craig Barrett, who also served as chief operating 
officer for Intel Corporation, announced, "The semiconductor industry is doing well, 
making money, and can afford to pay its own way" (ibid.). Of course, Barrett did not say
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the consortium would pay its own way, only that it could afford to do so. Indeed, the 
SEMATECH board stated its intention to replace the Defense Department funding by 
competing for federal research grants. At the time of the announcement. Congress already 
had approved the $90 million SEMATECH appropriation for fiscal year 1995 (ibid.).
In fiscal year 1996, a year scheduled to be the last in ARPA's sponsorship of 
SEMATECH (Lynn 1995), the question remains, "was SEMATECH a success?" From a 
retum-on-investment perspective, the anecdotal evidence appears disappointing. Several 
o f the members withdrew from the consortium, others struggled to justify their 
membership, and at least one was kept in only through the charity of a research program 
designed to accomplish that end. This record is particularly dismal, considering the fact 
that the companies put up only half of SEMATECH's funding. DOD covered half the cost 
of SEMATECH, yet the corporate members were able to appropriate returns on the total 
investment. Admittedly, the American semiconductor industry did make a comeback, but 
was that comeback the result of SEMATECH or its leadership at ARPA? Another 
possible explanation is found simply in recalling the changing market conditions during the 
relevant time period. The 1984-88 time frame played host to the Reagan defense buildup, 
during which the American semiconductor industry was unable to keep up with overall 
demand (Steinberg 1984). Because of defense procurement regulations, only American 
manufacturers were allowed to supply the demands of the Defense Department, creating a 
protected market and perhaps encouraging American companies to specialize in military 
requirements. Because of the size of the overall American market for semiconductors, 
Japanese manufacturers gained an opportunity to step in and supply the American 
commercial market, siphoning away market share. While American companies focused on 
the military customer, those Japanese companies may have been able to gain an advantage 
in meeting the requirements of the commercial sector. Thus, once the defense drawdown
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began, American manufacturers may have found themselves at a competitive disadvantage. 
The federal subsidy to SEMATECH may have bought the American manufacturers 
enough time to regain their market share. If so, SEMATECH itself may actually have 
been irrelevant. This is an area ripe for further study.
Even if SEMATECH can claim responsibility for resurrecting the American 
semiconductor industry, the question remains, at what cost? What advanced research 
programs did ARPA forego in order to fund and manage SEMATECH? Again, 
supporting America's semiconductor industry may be admirable and even justifiable from 
the vantage point of preserving an industry important to national security and America's 
economy, but it cannot be classified as advanced research. The unique capabilities of the 
Advanced Research Projects Agency are, therefore, wasted on such efforts. Other 
government agencies are likely to be equally capable of administering a subsidy. Those 
other agencies are not, however, capable of filling ARPA's role in selecting high-risk 
research projects with a potential for revolutionizing the art of war.
If  predictions by Craig Fields hold true, and ARPA is not able to refocus its efforts 
on advanced research for national defense, the agency may find itself involved in more 
projects like SEMATECH in the future. In 1989, Fields predicted the agency would be 
more active in the future in helping critical industries survive the threat o f foreign 
competition (Charles 1989). Critical, in Fields's terms, is meant to imply not only those 
industries critical to national security, but also those industries considered critical to 
American economic growth. Indeed, the High Definition Television (HDTV) project was 
another industry already targeted for DARPA aid at the time of Mr. Fields's remarks. 
Although several military uses for advanced/flat-panel displays have been identified, the 
driving force behind DARPA's initial involvement was the perceived lead the Japanese 
owned in this area (ibid.).
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ARPA's shift in direction did not occur without a struggle. The Bush 
Administration, opposed to the technology targeting idea, recognized the shift in DARPA 
priorities and fired director Craig Fields, who had spent an unusually lengthy 16 years at 
the agency. Surprisingly, one of Fields's many supporters was George A. Keyworth, the
v
science advisor to President Reagan. Defending Fields, Keyworth expounded, "DARPA 
and Fields's record is a string of one brilliant idea after another" (Carey 1990, 31). Thus, 
the ideological lines are not as clearly drawn as one might expect. Though the Bush 
Administration put up a valiant fight, Congress won out. As a result, the 1993 Defense 
Conversion package included funds for such Congressionally-directed projects as the 
"High Definition Display Manufacturing Consortia" and the Manufacturing Extension and 
Manufacturing Engineering Education programs (Davey 1993).
Today, funding for flat-panel displays appears to be alive and well, in the form of 
the High Definition Systems program, and ARPA continues to fund SEMATECH for yet 
another year. Fortunately, statements before Congress by recent ARPA directors seem to 
indicate that the High Definition Systems program has been directed toward meeting 
military needs. As current ARPA director Larry Lynn explained before the Subcommittee 
on National Security, House Appropriations Committee,
FY96 primary efforts are focused on the development and demonstration 
of: power efficient displays for man-portable tactical information and
cockpit applications; compact, high-brightness, large screen displays for 
command and control systems; and ultrahigh resolution displays for 
intelligence applications. The head mounted display program will shrink 
picture element size to allow over five million picture elements to be built 
in one square inch and provide high quality information to mobile warriors 
(1995).
Dr. Lynn identifies some exciting uses for high-definition systems which may very well 
help the U.S. military forces gain a technological edge on their adversaries. Whether this 
emphasis has come about as a result o f a leadership decision to focus on ARPA's
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traditional customer, or as a result of a smaller-than-expected commercial market is 
unclear. Another possible explanation is that ARPA directors may be trying to appease a 
Republican Congress which seems intent on cutting the size of government while 
preserving military capability. If  so, this would help explain the 1994 Clinton 
Administration decision which directed ARPA to manage a $600 million program "to 
develop a significant US manufacturing capability for flat panel displays" (Aviation Week 
and Space Technology 1994, 80). Whatever the driving force might have been, the 
current program is, indeed, worthy of the advanced research label, and does hold promise 
for military innovation. The prospect of ARPA again being tasked with administering 
industrial policy in lieu of pursuing advanced research remains, however, a legitimate 
concern.
2. Expanding Size
Why was ARPA ever saddled with a project like SEMATECH, which appears to 
fall outside the agency's mission area? Senator JefFBingaman, D-N.M. explained candidly 
that ARPA was the only agency with the available funds (Charles 1989). Ideally, the 
decision of who should manage a particular research project should consider agency 
missions and strengths. The decision should not be made on the basis of available 
budgetary resources. Senator Bingaman's explanation is only partial, however. The real 
story goes back to legislation (S. 1233, 1987) introduced by Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, to 
create a whole new agency within the Commerce Department to act as a civilian version of 
DARPA. Many politicians wanted to cash in on the success of DARPA by duplicating it 
in the civilian/industrial sector. The legislation failed because of the cost and ideological 
opposition by the Bush Administration. Supporters o f the idea did not, however, give up 
the fight to have civilian technology funded. In the absence of a civilian DARPA, they
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simply created a small civilian technology office within the Commerce Department called 
the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) and simultaneously broadened the mission of 
its defense counterpart (Davey 1993; Kitfield 1990).
Since 1986, ARPA has begun to receive more funds than its directors request. 
From 1986 to 1990, for instance, DARPA's budget doubled, with the agency receiving 
more funds than it requested in three of those five years (this occurred, incidentally, during 
a period in which DOD's budget declined, in real terms). The significance of this 
aberration is that 1) the agency is growing in size, and 2) the agency is losing its freedom 
from micromanagement. Congress is pushing ARPA to fund dual-use technologies and 
government/industry consortia by allocating more funds to those areas than its directors 
request. In 1993, for instance, ARPA requested $10 million for high resolution display 
research, and was allocated $100 million. ARPA also received $581 million in 
appropriations earmarked for civilian "conversion initiatives" which the agency did not 
even request (Davey 1993). Congress, it appears, now has the responsibility for deciding 
which initiatives ARPA will fund. It should come as no surprise, then, that politicians are 
anxious to increase the agency's funding. In the opinion of former DARPA director 
Robert Cooper (1982-84), these forays into non-defense areas can serve only to distract 
ARPA from its critical primary mission:
In the case of SEMATECH, Congress plunks a $200 million-plus 
consortium in DARPA's lap, and tells the agency to manage it. Not only is 
that a big project for an agency the size of DARPA, but it is probably a 
mismatch with the type of person who is a program manager there. They 
tend to be venture capitalist types, looking for high risk, high payoff 
technologies, rather than major project managers. And that trend will 
change DARPA for the worse (Kitfield 1990, 26-28).
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3. Changing Composition of Personnel
One of ARPA's great strengths has been its high turnover rate. While this 
characteristic may not be envied in many other organizations, it has helped ARPA by 
providing a continuous influx of highly-qualified scientists and engineers from the civilian 
sector. Typically, these people come in with the latest knowledge and fresh ideas and only 
stay long enough to oversee one major project. They bring a broad base of experience and 
talent from academia, industry, and the military. Recently, however, the situation has 
changed. More new scientists and engineers are arriving at ARPA from within 
government. In 1993, the composition of the ARPA staff was 80 percent government and 
20 percent industry, just the opposite of the ratio in the 1970s.
Compounding the problem of having more people from inside the government and 
less from industry, those from within government are staying at ARPA longer. Former 
director Gary Denman expressed this concern in an address before the Subcommittee on 
Defense, House Appropriations Committee:
I am also concerned that the tour of duty for civil service program 
managers at ARPA is increasing. In 1978, 75 percent of the civil service 
program managers had been assigned to ARPA for less than four years, 
and only four percent had been with the Agency for more than eight years. 
Currently, 46 percent of the ARPA program managers have less than four 
years at the Agency and 19 percent have been in place for more than eight 
years. This is an unfavorable trend. The more stringent ethics regulations 
designed to close the revolving door between government and industry 
contribute to this trend; however, there are other factors involved. The 
recruitment of the best and brightest talent from industry is seriously 
hindered by the current disparity in pay and the lengthy and unwieldy 
government hiring process. This is particularly evident in attempting to 
recruit for the senior-level ARPA Office Director positions (1994, 17).
As Dr. Denman mentions, the changing personnel composition is the result o f three
primary causes. First, the salary differential between inside and outside the government
has grown larger, increasing the penalty for the top people to serve a tour at ARPA.
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Second, the government hiring process deters good people from applying. Dr. Denman, 
however, seems to minimize the importance of what I believe may be the most significant 
factor: the federal government's new "revolving door" legislation. These ethics regulations 
are intended to prevent people from profiting in the private sector from their government 
service. On the surface, the regulations seem reasonable. After all, who wants to see 
government employees profiting from their public positions? The unintended effect, 
however, is to keep ARPA from the full talent pool.
ARPA has a long history of rather entangled relationships with private-sector 
organizations. The personnel shuffle among ARPA, MIT, and Bolt, Beranek, and 
Newman is an obvious example. Did Robert Taylor, the former director of the agency's 
computer research program, act inappropriately when he asked his old friends at ARPA 
for money to build the first computer network? Was ARPA wrong for selecting BBN as a 
key contractor on the ARPANET project? Such relationships probably would not be 
allowed today, due to the mere appearance of impropriety, but they were essential to the 
success of the network, because they implemented the best talent in the country. In the 
past, civilian scientists may have been willing to accept a pay cut to work at ARPA if they 
believed the tour would enhance their careers. If, however, civilian scientists fear taking a 
position at ARPA will mark the end of their private-sector careers, the prestige of serving 
in the agency is bound to suffer. This problem, therefore, is not likely to be solved simply 
by increasing program managers' pay.
Another change which may be relevant is the shift in the military-to-civilian ratio 
on the ARPA staff. As shown in Figures 5 and 6, the military presence on the ARPA staff 
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This is disturbing because the military/civilian mix was one of the strengths IDA identified 
in Volume 3 of their study:
The presence of military professionals on the DARPA staff has helped 
DARPA's understanding of Service problems associated with the program 
and of the context into which the output would fall, and with later Service 
acceptance of the programs (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 1991, V-10).
To the extent that the reduction in the military presence reduces the understanding 
of Service problems and impacts Service acceptance of ARPA programs, the agency's 
success rate (in terms of funding military innovations) may be expected to suffer. The 
next danger is closely related to the changing composition of personnel, and may be 
considered the reason for it.
4. Loss of Customer Focus
r
Many judge ARPA's success on the basis of the large number of commercial "spin­
offs" the agency has spawned. This is ironic because the spin-offs have occurred in spite 
of the agency's focus on military research. If ARPA can create so many commercial 
successes by accident, many reason, it could create many more by directly funding 
commercial research. Such ideas have received even more attention since the end of the 
Cold War. Adding to this sentiment is a report by the Council on Competitiveness, a blue- 
ribbon panel of industry and academic leaders, which warned in 1991 that America was 
losing its technological edge in the global marketplace. The report placed significant 
blame for this perceived technological decline on excessive defense spending (Perry 1991). 
Combined with the public's increased sensitivity to the size of the nation's budget deficit, 
these factors have made Congress less willing to invest in research aimed solely at 
defense-related objectives. They instead have become increasingly more interested in 
funding "dual-use technologies;" that is, research targeted toward both the military and 
commercial sectors.
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Many in Congress have grown impatient with waiting for spin-offs, and now 
believe more commercially-viable technologies may be generated by skipping the 
middleman (i.e., the defense sector) and directly targeting the various commercial 
industries. This new focus is reflected in the recent name change from DARPA to ARPA. 
Dropping "Defense” from the agency's name is meant to indicate a broader mission for the 
agency. In fact, the 1993 Defense Authorization bill required ARPA to "pursue 
imaginative and innovative research and development projects having . . . both military and 
commercial (dual-use) applications" (Davey 1993, 7). Jacques Gansler, in Affording 
Defense, defended the dual-use idea, explaining that "shifting the focus of defense R&D 
toward 'dual-use' technologies is not meant to replace private-sector funding of non­
defense R&D; it is meant to complement it" (1989, 236). Unfortunately, this change 
necessarily leads to a diluted focus and a dissolution of the supplier-customer relationship. 
If  ARPA is to fund research beneficial to everyone, how can it focus on anyone? How 
will it select which projects to fund without more definite objectives? DARPA knew its 
customer. Can ARPA ever know the needs of the amorphous private sector?
In 1993, President Clinton launched the multi-agency "Technology Reinvestment 
Program" for the purpose of fostering new dual-use technologies, simplifying the defense 
acquisition process, and easing the burden of the defense drawdown. If the project can 
achieve these goals, the benefit is expected to be in the form of a closer relationship 
between government and industrial research and development. This development ideally 
would lead to innovations useful to both the commercial and military sectors, and would 
help to hold down the cost of defense acquisitions. Teaming ARPA, the Department of 
Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Department of 
Energy, Department of Transportation, National Science Foundation (NSF), and NASA, 
the Technology Reinvestment Program is headed by ARPA. Again, the goals are
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laudable, and the program may prove worthwhile. The problem is that the Administration 
gave ARPA responsibility for directing the new project.
ARPA is well-suited for funding high-risk research to expand the envelope of 
defense technology. It is not, however, in any position to pass judgment about the 
commercial value of a technology or to rewrite the Defense Department's labyrinthine 
procurement regulations. With the federal government offering to pay for up to 50 
percent of the cost of research selected by the Technology Reinvestment Program, 
proposals for funding are plentiful. Unfortunately, only a small percentage of the 
proposals can be funded, given the program's limited budget. Somehow, then, the 
government agencies must decide which companies and which industries will receive 
government funding and which will not. The danger, o f course, is that such decisions will 
be made on the basis of political influences. Recognizing this unseemly situation, Sen. 
John McCain (R-AZ) told Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry, "We know there is 
intense competition for those funds. We would like to be assured that the funds are given 
on the basis of merit and not political influence" (Gregory 1993, 52).
Another concern is the issue of foreign participation in Clinton's defense 
conversion program. Most would agree that federal tax dollars should not go to foreign 
companies. Avoiding that outcome, however, is more difficult than many might imagine. 
In an increasingly global economy, a large number of successful companies are neither 
strictly American nor foreign, but are instead Multinational Corporations (MNC). Should 
American tax dollars assist companies with divisions in more than one country? ARPA's 
answer, responding to a nervous Congress, is "no." Funds will be restricted to companies 
with a "significant level of [their] research, development, engineering and manufacturing 
activities in the United States" (Gregory 1993, 53). Will that policy exclude the most 
successful companies, in favor of those that have not been able to expand globally? If  so,
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is ARPA not acting to circumvent market forces and prop up the relative failures? In 
effect, then, ARPA has taken on the role of a corporate welfare administrator. Somehow, 
that does not seem to fit in with President Eisenhower's original vision for the agency.
Considering the above concerns, one might question the justification for ARPA 
involvement in funding research to benefit the private sector. While military R&D may be 
justified on the basis of national defense being a public good, what is the rationale for 
funding commercial R&D with public money? Private companies fund research based on 
risk and expected returns. If risk is considered too great relative to expected returns for a 
private company to invest its own money, what is the rationale for the government taking 
money from its citizens to make such an investment? How can a government agency 
determine whether or not the private sector has under-invested in a particular technology? 
A broader focus also may present the opportunity for Congress to get more involved in 
selecting which projects will be funded. Many of DARPAs projects were highly classified, 
and therefore free of public scrutiny. ARPA will not have such a luxury when funding 
commercial research. Future research grants may well follow the example of the 
Department o f Agriculture and be spread out equally among congressional districts. 
Alternatively, research funds may be allocated to certain geographical areas to appease 
powerful members of Congress, or purchase key votes on other legislation. Individual 
industries also will have a stake in how the funds are invested. As a result, lobbyists are 
likely to fight for equitable distribution of the research grants among industries. The net 
result could be to extinguish the flame of innovation at ARP A.
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5. Increase in Micromanagement
Perhaps in response to criticism by the Council on Competitiveness, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense decided in 1992 to require the Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering (DDR&E) to certify annually that DOD research funds (including those 
controlled by ARPA) are allocated optimally (Davey 1993). Will this requirement result in 
pressure on ARPA to avoid the high-risk research that has been the agency's hallmark? 
Undeniably, the answer is yes. In fact, the Institute for Defense Analyses evaluation found 
evidence that, even before the Council on Competitiveness report, ARPA operations were 
becoming increasingly restrictive:
We emphasize that DARPA has generally managed its programs very 
effectively. It is critical that extreme care be taken in any efforts to 
"improve" management control within DARPA or over DARPA. It is 
important to avoid saddling DARPA with restrictive management controls 
and procurement procedures to "ensure" no mistakes are made, that it 
becomes too encumbered to provide its essential and fundamentally 
different type of R&D support for DOD. Over time DARPA has become 
increasingly restricted by processes and procedures in conformance with 
more standard contracting organizations (Van Atta, Deitchman, and Reed 
1991, V-9).
The source of this phenomenon also can be traced to mandated programs outside 
the realm of "high-risk, high-pay off advanced R&D," because those programs require 
management and procurement procedures not suited to ARPA's primary role (Van Atta, 
Deitchman, and Reed 1991). The agency has become overly burdened in recent years 
with mandated programs in such areas as prototyping and improving manufacturing 
technology, which are not the advanced form of research for which ARPA was founded.
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6. Resources Distributed Geographically: The TRP Case
It is the mission of the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) to 
stimulate the transition to a growing, integrated, national industrial 
capability which provides the most advanced, affordable, military systems 
and the most competitive commercial products. TRP programs are 
structured to expand high quality employment opportunities in commercial 
and dual-use United States industries and demonstrably enhance U.S. 
competitiveness. This will be accomplished through the application of 
defense and commercial resources to develop dual-use technologies, 
manufacturing and technology assistance to small firms, and education and 
training programs that enhance U.S. manufacturing skills and target 
displaced defense industry workers (ARPA 1993, 1-1).
While ARPA once focused its resources on a few Centers of Excellence, the 
Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP), started in 1993, provides an example of ARPA 
distributing its funds geographically, in a politically-acceptable fashion. Not only are the 
funds distributed throughout the country, but a portion of the funds are set aside for small 
businesses, through the Small Business Innovative Research Program. In this program, 
leadership in the field of research is less important than being a small company (i.e., less 
than 500 employees). In fact, should a small company be judged to "dominate” the field in 
which it submits a research project, that company will be disqualified (ARPA 1993)! 
Apparently, the idea of funding the best research is no longer paramount.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
The present study has provided an informal review of the literature useful in 
planning evaluations of the Advanced Research Projects Agency. It has suggested a few 
ideas for conducting evaluations of the individual projects, and has identified a plausible 
list o f factors which have enabled ARPA to achieve the degree of success with which it is 
so often credited. Along with those positive factors, the review has identified six trends 
which may be threatening the future of the agency.
ARPA has funded many innovative research projects over the past thirty-seven 
years, and has developed a loyal following of admirers. Still, in thirty-seven years, only 
one comprehensive evaluation has been performed, and that was funded under ARPA 
contract and did not include any detailed analysis. Beginning with an agenda of large, 
high-risk presidential issues, ARPA's advanced research efforts are now intermingled with 
managing government-industry consortia and doling out money to displaced defense 
workers and small businesses. The agency is at a cross-roads in its history and may have 
lost its clear direction. In-depth analysis is long overdue, and should help the agency to 
capitalize on its prior strengths to ensure a bright future. Such evaluations will be 
especially challenging, due to the difficulty in obtaining necessary data, but need to be 
started.
Patent citation analysis may offer some promise as an evaluation tool, provided the 
researcher can find the identification numbers of patents generated by ARPA. Finding 
these identification numbers is likely to be a very difficult task, however. The researcher 
may have more success in searching on-line databases of journal abstracts to assess the 
opinions of experts regarding particular areas of ARPA-funded research. This would 
provide a test of the assertion that ARPA is highly-respected in the scientific community.
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The most promising technique for future research efforts involves the use of case- 
studies. This approach may be useful in evaluating ARPA's contribution to key 
technological innovations. As mentioned earlier,12 ARPA's role in stealth technology may 
not be as significant as the agency claims, since much of the actual research was 
performed outside of ARPA's purview and prior to the agency's involvement. Case 
studies of other ARPA programs may reveal similar findings. Performed for several 
programs at various points in time, the case study approach also might reveal whether 
ARPA's impact has changed over the years.
The factors identified in Chapter 5 seem to be responsible, to some degree, for 
ARPA's apparent success in funding research. A thorough test of this hypothesis, 
however, will require a similar evaluation of other "peer" agencies, such as the National 
Institutes o f Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Naval Research Laboratory. 
Only when such evaluations are accomplished, and comparisons can be performed, will the 
evidence be sufficient to determine conclusively which characteristics lead to efficiency in 
funding successful research.
12 See page 22.
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Appendix A: Approximate ARPA Investments, through 1988, in 
Projects Selected by IDA





TRANSIT 52 p3-8 (vol 1) says 28M and 24M for a total of 42M
CENTAUR 22
SATURN 101.5
DEFENDER (ABM) ESAR 45 ESAR construction and testing, plus phased array technology program
TABSTONE 18
HE LASERS 1000 750M for lasers, plus about $250M for space mirrors work
OTH RADAR 100










AGILE AR-15/M-16 0.5 0.1 plus expense of field office in Vietnam (est. $100K)
CAMP SENTINEL 7
X-26B-QT-2 0.25
POCKET VETO 12 $6M direct cost, plus $6 M for predecessor programs
INF. PROCESSING ILLIACIV 59 $31M development cost, plus $28M for "shakedown and utilization"
Project MAC 25
ARPANET 25
Al 120 130 Up to Strategic Computing Program (est. additional $130M)
Morse Code Reader 2
ACCAT 15.7
LAMBDA 12 36 Not including MFA, FME, or OMAT (est. $12M each)
SLCSAT 150
Interact. Comp. Graphics 0 100 No figure provided (est. $100M)
Image Understanding 72 Through 1988
ADA 0 5 No figure provided - ARPA played a mqt role (est. $5M)
SIMNET 32.1 15% of $214M total
VLSI 0 100 No figure provided; MOSIS said to be low-cost because it was able
To leveraqe the VLSI investment (18-32, vol 2). Est. $100M
MOSIS 54 Facility and staff: $30M; Proj. support: $24M (18-24, vol 2)




PAVE MOVE R/TAWDS 50
BETA 9
CELT 11
ARMOR/ANTI-ARMOR 100 100 Up to 1985 (est. $100M afterward)
SURVEILLANCE TEAL RUBY/HICAMP 354 24M initial, 100M overrun, 230M1982 baseline addl funds
AVIATION TECH STEALTH 0 1000 No estimate provided- cited security concerns. Guess $1B
X-29 126.85 AO 3436:8.85M. AQ4188:118M
NAVAL TECH ARC 64
MATERIALS Digital Gallium Arsenide 5.5 14.5 1977 Rockwell effort: $5.5M; no figures for later programs. Est. $20M total
IDLs 158
F-100 Engine RFC 13 $7M direct costs, plus $6M for related work
TOTAL 3700.4 1485.6 These projects represent up to $5.19 Billion of ARPA's 1958-88 budgets
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Appendix B: The AIDS Patent Project Search Engine
The search engine used for the AIDS Patent Project13 is the same tool which will be used 
for the new system to be introduced by the USPTO on 9 November, 1995. This system 
will allow access to over twenty years of bibliographic text data from the front pages of 
patent applications.
The AIDS Patent Project has two search tools, one a free text search, and the other a two- 
field boolean search. The free text search tool is available on the AIDS Patents Search 
Page, http://patents.cnidr.org/pto/search.html, and consists of a form resembling the 
following:
Enter terms to find: _______________
Search on field:_______________
{Options: Full Text, Patent Number, Title, Abstract, Inventor Name, Assignee Name, 
Claims, Original Classification}
Enter terms to de-emphasize:_______________
Search on field:_______________  {Options same as above}
The second tool is available on the AIDS Patents Boolean Search Page, 
http://patents.cnidr.org/pto/bool.html, and consists of a form resembling the following:
Enter first term :_______________
Search on Field:
{Options: Full Text, Patent Number, Title, Abstract, Inventor Name, Assignee Name, 
Claims, Original Classification}
Boolean operator;_______________ {Options: and, or, andnot}
Enter second term :_______________
Search on Field._______________ {Options same as first field}
13 Home Page http://patents.cnidr.org/welcome.html
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Appendix C: ARP A Staff Size bv Year
Year Civilian Military Total Year Civilian Military Total
1963 109 60 169 1980 121 29 150
1964 125 65 190 1981 123 29 152
1965 149 61 210 1982 123 29 152
1966 148 57 205 1983 131 32 163
1967 153 54 207 1984 130 30 160
1968 147 58 205 1985 125 25 150
1969 136 61 197 1986 125 26 151
1970 128 60 188 1987 139 26 165
1971 122 59 181 1988 130 26 156
1972 126 59 185 1989 145 28 173
1973 118 55 173 1990 145 27 172
1974 118 43 161 1991 140 26 166
1975 120 33 153 1992 145 24 169
1976 120 33 153 1993 158 24 182
1977 113 32 145 1994 152 24 176
1978 108 30 138 1995 158 24 182
1979 117 29 146
Table [I: ARP A Staff Size, by Year (Source: A]RPA, unpublished)
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Glossary
AGILE Vietnam-era counterinsurgency R&D program
AI Artificial Intelligence
ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency
ASSAULT BREAKER Standoff follow-on forces attack program
BBN Bolt, Beranek, and Newman
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
C3 Command, Control, and Communications
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DEFENDER Ballistic missile defense program
DOD Department of Defense
DOE Department o f Energy
EEMIT Experimental Evaluation of Major Innovative Technologies
IDA Institute for Defense Analyses
IPTO Information Processing Techniques Office
IRR Internal Rate of Return
LIGHTSAT Program to develop small satellites for tactical C3
MAC Multiple Access Computer / Machine Aided Cognition
MNC Multinational Corporation
MIMIC Microwave/millimeter-wave monolithic integrated circuit chips
MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASP National Aerospace Plane
NIH National Institutes of Health
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NRL Naval Research Laboratory
NSF National Science Foundation
ONR Office of Naval Research
PM Program Manager or Project Manager
R&D Research and Development
SBIR Small Business Innovative Research Program
SCP Strategic Computing Program
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SEMATECH The Consortium of Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology
STARS Software Technology for Adaptable Reliable Systems
STO Strategic Technologies Office
TCP/IP Transfer Control Protocol / Internet Protocol
TEAL RUBY Space-based infrared surveillance program
TRP Technology Reinvestment Program
USD A U.S. Department of Agriculture
USPTO U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
VELA Nuclear test detection program
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